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I. INTRODUCTION 
Interest groups have tended to exert a major influence during the past 
two decades and particularly in urban contexts. From the political and 
ideological standpoints, the advocacy role played by interest groups and its 
impact on public policy have received the attention of the media. However, 
the symbiotic role which interest groups play in moulding urban policy still 
remains largely unexplored. 
In theory interest groups play an essential role in democratic 
political systems of urban government, providing an outlet through which the 
citizen may participate to some degree in the shaping of urban policy. 
These groups help mobili.ze public opinion, and provide organizational and 
ideological support for citizen needs and preferences. Interest groups do 
provide critical inputs into the urban community decision~making system. 
Despite these co~tributions, interest groups are often considered as both 
normatively and operationally marginal. Regardless of variations in 
political structure and culture, group legitimacy and the intensity of 
lobbying, interest groups play a critical linkage role, bringing together 
the private and public sectors. 
The political behaviour of interest groups at the urban government 
level often include direct or indirect attempts to influence governmental 
elites and their decisions. Canada inherited from Britain an organic, 
corporatist social philosophy in which the role of private groups is 
considered equally legitimate as that of government and equally necessary 
for policy making which would be in the public interest. Furthermore, 
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collective corporation refers to a conception of society in which government 
freely delegates many of its functions, and much of its largesse, to private 
groups which enjoy both normative and functional legitimacy in the political 
system. 
Underlying this study is a very basic assumption that organized 
interest groups are important actors in the urban policy process. Organized 
interest groups are more likely to have a leadership structure, and 
communication occurs between group leaders and city council. Such groups 
try to influence the urban decision~making system because they perceive a 
stake - a public policy outcome. That stake can be something the interest 
group wants to gain or protect. Different kinds of resources are used by 
interest groups to influence public policy. 
The urban political arena is filled with numerous groups with different 
memberships, interests, and political ideologies and strategies. Not all 
groups actively seek to influence urban policies in order to maximize 
benefits and preserve their group interests. The purpose of this study is 
to examine the dynamics of interest groups in urban life. We have tried to 
examine the following dimensions of interest groups: the legitimacy of 
interest groups, the issues that concern them, the resources they possess 
and the tactics they use in attempting to influence urban government policy, 
patterns of communication, political structure and culture in which they 
operate, and the nature and extent of interest groups• influence on urban 
policy. 
The study of urban policy process presents an important need to 
review the relationship of civic government to the group actors within 
its jurisdiction. Mediation of aggregate interests through group 
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structures is not a new phenomenon, yet our changing urban social 
relationships have, in more recent times, been subject to an expansion of 
the breadth of interest areas beyond the traditional business and ratepayers 
issues and into the social service field. While the social service field 
has burgeoned over the past decade thus initiating intrusions into the 
exclusiveness of long~standing civic jurisdictions, other interests are 
undergoing growth as well. In recent years, a new wave of interest groups 
have been calling upon civic authorities for a share of the policy 
decision~making process. 
One may understand group interests as part of private sector 
organized citizen participation involving the active attempt to alter 
policy directions, yet the mediators of aggregated interests are not 
exclusively based on this type of approach. It is difficult to ascribe 
"private" to the understanding of political parties and school boards; 
attempts to influence decisions on urban policy may be described as 
peripheral to the activities of social need groups or the elderly; and 
the long~standing separation of the citizenry from the governing 
executive diminishes with the increase of a wider spectrum of legitimized 
interest orientations which depends upon cooperation, not competition, with 
government and a favourable will and commitment on the part of 
elected representatives. The study of politics at the urban level can 
no longer be content with the rudiments of interest group dynamics based on 
traditional groups or conflict. 
This study attempts to identify traditional and emerging relationships 
between areas of citizen interest and local government in the City of 
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Winnipeg. It is hoped that a better understanding of the diversity and 
complexity of groups and their needs will lead towards altered civic 
rationale and, therefore, new local government responsibilities designed to 
better serve a greater proportion of all interests. The following review of 
research and theory is intended to set the stage for analyses of interest 
groups in Winnipeg. 
II. RESEARCH AND THEORY 
A review of relevant literature reveals some limitations of research on 
interest groups. First, the diversity of group interests necessitates an 
interdisciplinary approach. However, most studies on interest groups focus 
upon political aspects. While the relationship between business and 
government, an understanding of socio~economic variables, activities of 
political parties, and the dynamics of groups of protest are researched by 
political scientists, other interest groups and issues that require an 
interdisciplinary approach are few. Philanthropy, for example, is discussed 
largely from a moral perspective which is quite remote to the relation of 
the city to the group. School boards, as another example, are not 
considered \~ithin the context of civic government as they constitute a level 
of government in themselves. In short, studies on the relationship of some 
interest groups to government are unavailable. 
Second, much of the research originates in the United States and is, 
therefore, specific to that culture. There is overlap with the Canadian 
experience, yet one must be wary of the heavy emphasis placed upon the 
pluralist conflict model 1 of interest articulation and the increased role 
of private sector and decreased role of public sector sponsorship of social 
agencies. Further, the overt competitive and individualist values of 
Americanism tend to be a roadblock to increased government leadership in 
non~traditional areas of interest. The American perspective emphasizes 
government responsiveness to interests rather than active cooperative 
1 This same view is also expressed in Pross (1975, p. 18). The 
context for Pross is the "Canadian System." 
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involvement or leadership. A comparative analysis of group cultural 
differences would indeed be a worthy venture, yet, for the purpose of this 
research the American model of group activity cannot be adequately applied 
to Canada. 
Third, the research on certain aspects of interest groups pertains to 
the senior level of government and not the local government. This is not to 
say that activities are unrelated, but rather that the issue of local 
government has not been a subject of interest. The problem is reflected in 
the relative paucity of research on interest groups in urban communities. 
Fourth, many studies provide perspectives on traditional relationships, 
the business sector in particular, and more recent developments such as 
resident reaction to the neighbourhood invasion of the development industry 
in the past decade. Missing, however, is contemporary information on these 
types of interests which are non~confrontational, social~service oriented, 
or not directly related to local government~~~the school board, for example. 
Furthermore, most studies seem to have less relevance to contemporary urban 
milieu. 
Fifth, while political value systems, ie., ideologies, are not 
generally as apparent at the local level as they are at senior 
government levels, the literature on civic politics is reflective of such 
distinctions. Political ideologies broady categorized as 11 Right, 11 "Centre" 
and "Left" are represented. On the Right, Heinz Eulau (1973) avoids 
discussion of influence resulting from protest action and pays almost no 
attention to the role of business interests or those entities which are not 
accommodated by the political system yet who make demands upon it. There is 
- 10 -
an implicit assumption that political process is vested in the trust given 
to officials whose authority is legitimate; and it appears that groups that 
deviate from subordination to the authority trust of the elected are 
insufficiently legitimized to have a place in the study. 
Most studies, however, are more reflective of a liberal tradition 
(Lineberry and Sharkansky, Pross, McGahan, Zisk, Cole, Kaplan, Clark). 
These studies, unlike Eulau's study, address the role of economic 
power i.e. business and assess citizen protest as a legitimate exercise, and 
make distinctions between socio~economic power groupings. Finally, a more 
recent addition to the literature comes from the "Left" (Pickvance, 
Gutstein, Lorimer, Aubin, Gerecke, Sewell, Tabb and Sawers, Castells, 
Harloe, Roussopoulus). The attention here shifts from dry analyses of the 
systems and structures of political frameworks and profiles of salient 
actors towards the dynamics of subjective will operating in social 
perspective. The polity is not assessed in sterile research environments 
where one variable is controlled while measuring another. The statistical 
descriptions are assumed and used as tools to bring into question the 
tensions between entities relative to the urban polity. 
Can ideologically~based subjective interpretation be avoided? The 
answer to this dilemma is, of course, subject to interpretation. As such, 
the real question is not how to avoid subjectivity, but rather how to deal 
with it. A single theoretical model has not been followed in this 
analysis. Instead, attempts have been made to selectively employ, whenever 
relevent and meaningful, different theoretical~ideological models without 
being overly concerned with rigorous purity. 
Theory as reflected in the literature follows two major orientations. 
As previously mentioned, there was a grouping of liberal social science 
writers and a grouping of socialist writers. In regard to the urban 
interest group culture, both branches of thought projected their ideas in 
identifiable eras until the late 1970s. Since that time, however, 
development of theories of interest group politics has stagnated. It is 
necessary, then, to acknowledge the resulting vacuum and to review the 
established analytical base. 
Pross (1975) considers an interest group in the national context and 
states that, "pressure groups are organizations whose members act together 
to influence policy in order to promote their common interest."2 There 
is continuity with the American model; the assumptions of activity rests on 
competitive circumstances; and the group acts consciously to have an effect 
on government. 
Some assumptions are implicit to this concept. First, Lineberry and 
Sharkansky (1978) and Eulau (1973) make references to the stakes at city 
hall, but almost exclusively in light of business interests3, that is, 
interests which focus on economic growth of the city and lower taxes.4 
The implication is that the money invested or expected by business 
enterprise gives them a stake in policy far above other interests. 
2 Pross, page 2. 
3 Lineberry/Sharkansky, page 95; Eulau, page 330. 
4 Lineberry/Sharkansky, page 104. 
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Without a stake in policy direction, it is not expected that a group would 
need to concern itself with city government. 
Second, the group is sufficiently endowed as to be capable of funding 
its own efforts. The issue of the funding of interest groups originating 
from government sources has not received much attention by researchers. A 
study undertaken for the Canadian Council on Social Development by Novia 
Carter, (1974) is an exception. Third, it is assumed that the demands of 
the group making appeals to policy decisions are in fact eligible for 
accommodation. As accommodation is determined by councillors attitudes on 
what is or is not legitimate, it should not be expected that all demands are 
acted upon. This assumption cannot account for the absence of groups which 
have been frustrated to the point of giving up, and therefore, are absent 
from the list of major group actors. 
A recent study of councillors• attitudes to interest groups provided 
evidence to show an hierarchy of favour. A survey (Chekki, 1983) of the 
senior councillors and mayors in cities in Western Canada showed that the 
groups most favoured were the elderly and business, the groups least 
favoured were low income and minority groups, and, within the mid~range, 
neighbourhood associations, unions and homeowners fared better than 
ratepayers associations, the media, churches, or civic groups. Political 
parties were not mentioned by any respondent. 
Influence was seen as somewhat different. The groups most significant 
in influencing city council was business with neighbourhood associations, 
and unions clustered for a distant second. Most other groups had influence 
ratings closer to the bottom of the scale with the very bottom being shared 
by the church and elderly as well as minority and low~income groups. The 
most salient feature was the consistently high ratings for business and low 
ratings for minorities and the poor. 
Similar findings are reported in studies by Zisk (1983). While 
business is again substantially higher than any other group in terms of 
influence, low~income groups are not mentioned and seniors are rated 
1 ow.5 
Constructing a profile of favoured and unfavoured interest groups from 
the research should provide a theoretical basis for understanding interest 
group success. Ample data regarding group characteristics of business has 
been collected. There is, however, an acute paucity of profiles of any 
other major groups• interest area. 
Business follows the C. Wright Mills notion that control of 
institutions of power is equated with influence. 6 In practice, in 
statistical breakdowns of the city councils of Winnipeg, Toronto, and 
Vancouver, James Lorimer shows that half or more of the councillors were 
allied with the property industry and asserts that it would be rare to find 
a council with fewer than one~third having this stripe.7 A similar 
observation is made by Lineberry and Sharkansky (1978) who also add that 
office holders are recruited from the ranks of business and the professions 
thus substantiating the claim that business commands formidable political 
resources. 8 In terms of interaction with government elites, the 
5 Zisk, page 23. ~ Zeigler, page 89. 
Lorimer, page 96. 
8 Lineberry/Sharkansky, page 105. 
directors of business groups rank substantially higher than other 
groups. 9 Business group directors are also substantially better paid 
than directors of other groups, yet, on the basis of occupation and 
educational status, theSES index for business directors is not the highest 
overa11. 10 In short, the findings of the numerous analyses show that 
business people are well established and legitimized as participants in the 
political process and have easy access to civic government. 
The antithesis to the profile of the business groups (or the best 
documented group that has achieved success), then, would produce a 
profile of a group having little access to government officials, little 
interaction, and little representation on council. The group in 
question would be poorly educated with low status occupations and low 
income. Verba and Nie (1972) indicate that such attributes are 
consistent with political inactivity. As minority groups and low~income 
groups are at the bottom of the list of influential actors (Chekki, 1983), 
one might add the attributes of minority group status and poverty to the 
profile. 
As groups are at best influential and not the actual 
decision~makers, the character and attitudes of the councillors are a 
factor in relationships. A study by Joyce and Hosse (Toronto, 1970) 
describes the average councillor as being "conservative, Protestant, 
affiliated with a business group, about fifty years old, married with two 
children, owns his own house, has lived in the community for at least 
io Presthus, page 127. 
Presthus, page 125. 
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fifteen years, and is employed in a professional or managerial 
position."11 underrepresented, then, are women, low-income people, 
non-property owners, working class, less educated people, non-business, 
single and unmarried persons, and so on.12 
It would be a mistake to value the evidence in either positive or 
negative lights. It would also be a mistake to assume that the reason for 
such generally recognized inequity between rich and poor is the result of 
some coordinated will. Residual, however, is the fact that evidence in the 
literature overwhelmingly supports the view that political power is vested 
in elites and privileged sectors of society. 
Will the data for the Winnipeg case support a theory that the 
business sector occupies a position of privilege encouraged by council? 
Are groups outside of the business sector ignored? Which group•s 
attributes correlate with council favour or disfavour? 
The research on interest groups makes passing references to modes of 
communication used by group actors in the process of contact with officials. 
Two hypotheses seem to emerge. First, there is a positive correlation 
between a favourable group relationship with civic officials and intimate 
11 As quoted in McGahan, page 308. 
12 As a footnote to this conclusion, Eulau writes about 7 areas of group 
representation - namely 1. main street business interest, 2. a 
quasi-government sector, 3. public interest conservation, 4. large 
landowners and upper class economic elites, 5. industrial and 
manufacturing interest, 6. taxpayer and homeowner groups, and 7. 
recreation and education sectors. Missing from his study are the 
lower-income and minority groups which rated low in influence (Chekki, 
1983). See Eulau, page 367. 
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modes of communication. Support for this hypothesis was found in the 
studies by Verba and Nie, Eulau, Prethus, Lorimer, Sewell and Gutstein. 
Second and conversely, groups that resorted to protest, for whatever 
reasons, positively correlate with disfavour. Paul Schumaker•s study (1975) 
is salient in this area. As a complimentary hypothesis it would be 
desirable to explore the correlation between groups using lobby activities 
and their use of protest or intimate contact: the frequency of use of lobby 
forums is lower among groups who also resort to protest. 
In summary, a review of the literature permits understanding of 
some of the theoretical directions to be investigated in this study. 
The prominence of business interests is salient as is the marginal 
consideration of lower-class interests which are most often not 
mentioned. There is a lack of research on interest groups that fell outside 
of the traditional scope of civic jurisdictions. Does the Winnipeg case 
share similar features? 
Within the literature, and especially the American sources, there 
is a dominant perception that interest groups are involved in a 
competitive self~regarding environment. Groups use their available 
resources to influence decisions in their favour and either win or lose 
in relation to other similar groups. Government is perceived as having 
a place elevated and divorced from the policy and is charged with 
sorting out who gets what among competing forces. Such a perception is 
narrow and omits both the situation where a group pursues initiatives which 
are of no consequence to other groups and the situation in which group 
interest demands a sense of cooperation between the group and government or 
~ 17 -
other groups. The reader should note that different interests have greater 
compatibility with cooperation or laissez-faire than they do with 
competition. 
III. METHODS OF RESEARCH: SAMPLE 
The research data on the relationship of the civic government to its 
constituent group interests were obtained by using an interview guide (see, 
Appendix (i}) through in~person interviews. Reports issued by some of the 
groups, presentations made by group representatives, and statistical data 
were useful. Each interview (which followed a similar format) lasted one 
hour on average and was conducted by the same interviewer using the same 
interview guide. In each of the 16 interviews, the interviewee 
was the representative spokesperson of the group and held an official 
position on the group•s executive. Interviews were conducted in the month 
of July 1983, with the exception of one further interview which was 
conducted in April 1984. Using similar format, the later interview was 
conducted to expand interest orientations to include an important sector not 
present in the initial round-- the elderly. 
The definition of 11 interest group .. differs from the perception of a 
group whose members hold a certain viewpoint or have a particular need 
which is brought forward to government in lobby fashion. Such a group 
would be a competitor13 for government resources among similar 
competitors all attempting to apply pressure to effect policy direction. 
This definition is rather narrow in its scope. It tends to exclude many 
groups that attempt to influence urban policy. For the purpose of this 
study an organized interest group refers to a formally recognizable citizen 
13 In Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics, Robert Presthus does 
not explicitly include competitiveness in his list of resources used by 
organization, with or without either formal membership or constituency, 
whose activity has some element of societal involvement which is or could be 
identifiable with the urban community environment. 
The universe of interest groups that would fall within this definition 
could be identified through a compilation of organized interest groups in 
Winnipeg. Because groups are continually being formed or disbanded and are 
often obscure and out of view, description of an absolute population is not 
possible. To derive a sample, the questionnaire (see Appendix (ii)) issued 
to mayors as a part of a major study on urban pol icy provided a general 
guide to salient interest areas. The groups interviewed were thought to 
best represent the relevant areas. In certain instances where more than one 
perspective was necessary, additional groups within the same interest 
orientation were chosen for interviews. As a result this study reviews 
eight interest areas encompassing sixteen interest groups. 
The areas of interest reviewed include: philanthropy, unionism, social 
only need, business, the elderly, political parties, and the school board. 
While business is adequately represented by interviews, the 
property~development~ industry side of business was difficult to access and 
sensitive to criticism. It could be argued that the media should be 
included, but the media does not ascribe to this study's definition of 
interest groups as it is not a formally recognizable citizen organization; 
the media belongs to the corporate sector. Churches were only rarely active 
in urban politics and were, therefore, left out of the sample. The 
group directors. He says 11 resources of directors include five types: 
commitment, political efficacy, persuasiveness, legitimacy, and what 
may be called 'the cooperative ethic! 11 page 122. 
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interests represented provide a broad sample of major group actors who 
function in the City of Winnipeg, but not all major actors. This study 
attempts to present some salient aspects of these perspectives in the 
context of prior research and the proposed theoretical orientation. 
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IV. INTEREST GROUPS IN WINNIPEG 
In this study, data from the interviews were used to assess several 
variables in terms of their universality across the sample. Some of these 
variables and attributes lend themselves to an aggregation within 
distinguishable areas of analysis. The areas of analysis include the 
pattern of city council's extent of favour or disfavour towards interest 
groups, including funding patterns and communication patterns. The data 
presented in tables represent universal variables. Some aspects of the 
city~group relationship, however, are unique and specific to certain groups 
only. In the latter category, two cases will be presented. 
A. REVENUE SOURCES 
The power of interest groups tends to be correlated to the group's 
financial base. Most interest groups, however, are largely on their own to 
raise operational revenues. The question of interest group funding is 
inadequately documented to provide a firm basis for theoretical 
understanding. No clear model emerges by which the relevance of funding 
sources may be adequately treated. 
Two significant epochs have occurred in the Winnipeg situation as a 
result of changed group income sources and have transformed the traditional 
standings of quite a diversity of interests. The first epoch was initiated 
by the NDP provincial administration of Edward Schreyer in the early 1970s. 
The NDP government's approach is reported to have been "vastly more open 
(in) communication between provincial and governmental departments and 
citizen self~help groups."14 Funding of 32 social service agencies in 
Winnipeg in 1969 amounted to $2,613,554, but, in 1970, which marks the NDP's 
14 carter, page 73, 74. 
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first full year in office, funding doubled to a level of $5,464,957. 15 
With the changes came a new role for government in its relationship with 
service agencies. 
A better understanding of the thoughts behind this new pattern of 
activity may be found in the following quotation from a report of Winnipeg's 
Community Welfare Planning Council (1971) regarding the role of the United 
Way and that agency's determination of service agency allocations: "the 
corresponding goals have been related primarily to United Way objectives, 
and not enough attention has been spent examining the nature of persistent 
unmet needs, or analyzing the extent to which social policies tend to 
support these needs. n16 Essenti a 1 to this epoch is recognition of the 
extensive resources of government and the evolution of the recognition of 
selected services as being within public responsiblity. 17 That is, once 
the service has been deemed necessary to the community, government as the 
distributor of public good has a role in assuming responsibilities for 
funding service agencies. As a consequence, growth in the number of 
agencies funded by government and the United Way, for example, increased to 
57 in 1982 (United Way Annual Report, 1982). 
The second epoch began in 1980 with the formation of the Core~Area 
Initiatives (CAl) Fund. Leaders of the three levels of government agreed to 
contribute $33 million each to a fund whose purpose was directed towards 
downtown revitalization. Activities included support for social service 
15 carter, page 196. i~ as quoted in Carter, page 211. 
carter, page 53. 
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agencies and also support for programs of training and employment, housing, 
community facilities, community services, small business assistance, and 
historic area development. All three governments have actively involved 
themselves in roles that are expanded in an unprecedented way. Without 
digressing into the details of funding which are available in the CAI 
"Status Report," February 1984, a host of social services agencies and 
businesses, as well as individual citizens receive funds. For the citizen 
group, the CAI fund can be used to sustain its activities or create new 
ones. The result has been that group interest activity has mushroomed 
creating an identifiable strata of social agencies that would not be able to 
function in the absence of this new funding source. 
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TABLE 1 
FUNDING SOURCES OF INTEREST GROUPS 
FUNDING 
SOURCES 
City Government 
Government (Non~City)/ 
CAI 
Member Dues 
Profit Ventures 
Private Contributions 
*NA =Not Applicable 
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Table 1 on funding sources was constructed using the range of sources 
mentioned in the interviews. There was only one group---the 
unions---which was solely self funded. Private contributions such as 
foundation grants or donations from individuals were available to the 
philanthropic group, political parties, and one research group. Both the 
research groups and the neighbourhood development corporation depended 
upon profit generating projects as a primary funding source. In the 
former case, contract research was carried out; in the latter case, the 
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group was involved in construction projects, rental of commercial space, 
and administration of programs for a fee. The Senior's group ran a travel 
agency as a private group-enterprise, yet the revenue obtained was a 
secondary income source. Member dues, which were the only funding source 
for unions, was the most important primary source for business. Political 
Parties also received member dues, yet the amount of revenue was 
reflective of a secondary source. Dependency upon member dues was 
possible in the cases of labour and business because of the commitment of 
members through legal arrangements and favourable disposition to the high 
level of importance of the group's activity. In other groups, however, 
fees of any substance would have served to deter membership. 
Non~city government sources of funding were relevant to the 
philanthropic group, the social services agencies, the neighbourhood 
development corporation, and seniors. The money received by the 
philanthropic group came from provincial government lottery revenues. As 
it is ultimately part of provincial jurisdiction, the change in the role 
of government has to date extended to supplementing a philanthropic group 
which has a long tradition of private sector giving. The amount in 
question was approximately 18% of the philanthropic group's 1982 budget 
according to the Annual Report. This marks a significant alteration in 
the complexion of philanthropic giving. 
The only groups in this study sample to receive funds from the city 
were the elderly and business. Such a finding correlates strongly with 
mayor's and councillor's responses (Chekki, 1983} which placed the elderly 
and business ahead of any other private sector entity in terms of 
"favou rab 1 e responses" to groups. In the case of the senior • s group, the 
city government contributed $98,000 in 1982 and $104,000 in 1983, this 
represents approximately 13.2% of total group revenue and a signifcant 
contribution by any standard. (Annual Report). The more prestigious of 
the two business groups received funds from the city to finance a business 
development corporation whose mandate was one of "providing assistance and 
advice to expanding local businesses and to new businesses considering 
locating in Winnipeg.••18 The exact amount of funding involved was not 
available, yet in the interview, it was indicated that the group provided a 
staff of nine and the city provided funds. 
An interesting aspect of the development corporation was that it was 
billed as an initiative of both the group and the city. What is 
demonstrated in this perception is the intimacy between the two. Whereas 
other groups• projects are at times staffed by the group and funded by the 
government, they would hardly stem from joint initiatives. While staff 
are group personnel, it should not be assumed that policy would be 
formulated in isolation from the city. Rather, one would expect the 
intimacy to extend to a cooperative~consultative process between the 
project staff and the city. 
The fact that the city provides funds to the elderly and business, 
but no other group, reinforces the findings of a previous study (Chekki, 
1983) and reflects the literature showing that council favours these two 
groups. The privileged position of business in relation to civic 
decision~makers is in evidence on this basis. The practices of the City of 
18 "The Chamber", page 8 in "Mid Canada Commerce, .. June 1983. 
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Winnipeg are consistent with the traditional roles of city governments and 
are unreflective of more recent trends in provincial and federal involvement 
in group funding. Participation in the tri-level government venture 
provides a different direction, yet a better assessment of attitudes is 
required before straying from the conclusion that traditional relationships 
dominate at the local government level in Winnipeg. 
B. PATTERNS OF COMMUNICATION 
The second major variable that significantly contributed to the 
understanding of city~group relations was communication. Through an 
inventory of the modes of communication and their accompanying 
implications, one is able to obtain a more in~depth assessment of who has 
access to channels of influence and who is shunned and alienated. Several 
variations are present regarding the proximity of a group to these 
linkages, and so, by differentiation of communication techniques, measures 
of the intimacy of communication between the city and groups are made 
possible. 
The range of communication modes extended from the friendly call to the 
mayor•s office to frustrating and fruitless protest demonstrations. Quite 
expectedly, those who were prone to using protest action did not have 
access to the mayor through the friendly phone call. In these two opposing 
instances, there is a clear attempt to communicate group concerns to affect 
civic policy. The implicit assumption is that the greater the stake in 
civic policy, the greater the motive to communicate concerns. The strength 
of a motivating force would have proportional consequences on the 
willingness of a group to express its concerns. For this reason, the 
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following discussion assesses stakes as they apply to each group in the 
sample. 
(i) Stakes as a Factor in Motivation. 
The interview was inadequate as a vehicle for assessing a group's 
stake in civic policy because it was inherently difficult to achieve a 
ranking of the importance of interests according to group leaders' 
attitudes. Whereas the philanthropic group had minor concerns with city 
policy, for example, unions had serious concerns in the areas of wages and 
working conditions. Both group leaders, however, saw their relationship 
with the city as being very important. By what criteria may stakes be 
determined? Reference regarding stakes is made in Eulau (1973) and 
Lineberry and Sharkansky (1978} indicating high stakes for business and 
taxpayer's groups. It should be noted that the perception of high or low 
stakes is based upon the assumption that there will be policy outputs and 
that such outputs will affect the group. The underlying assumption is that 
city policies affect the group's financial interest. The question arises: 
should financial variables serve as criteria for stakes in every case? The 
criteria relevant to the school board, for example, would be better 
understood as quality of education and the criteria for social need groups 
would be quality of service affecting constituent well~being. For seniors, 
the stake in city policy might well involve peaceful neighbourhoods and 
efficient transit services. Where city policy has an impact, the group 
would have a stake. The record of viewing group civic stakes in terms of 
financial advantage is ideally suited to business goals, yet there was no 
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other interest~area in this study that placed profit as being central to its 
raison d•etre. 
As indicated, the base assumption is that potential for policy output 
which would affect the group exists and that output potential precedes a 
group•s stake. There is, however, no guarantee that policy output will 
occur to satisfy group needs. If, for example, the attitudes of 
councillors are unsympathetic to the problems of the unemployed or city 
native (Canadian Indians and Metis) people, it is possible that those 
concerns are not perceived to be sufficiently legitimate to warrant 
attention through policy~making. Such 11 illegitimate .. concerns would be 
left out of civic affairs. The subsequent alternatives would include the 
mustering of sufficient protest action which would create an intolerable 
situation, and thereby force relevant policy. 
By what rationale are some groups viewed as legitimate and others 
illegitimate? If there is an absence of supporting rationale considered to 
be credible by a majority of councillors, the subjected group is not 
perceived as having legitimate claims to city resources by incumbents who 
may then avoid whole sets of interest oriented policies. If policy output 
or the hope of its occurrence is realized not to be forthcoming, the group 
either protests and is labelled radical and undesirable or it abandons 
efforts to bring its concerns to council. Group concerns may become dormant 
through frustration or passive resignation, yet there is no basis to assert 
that interest concerns evaporate. An adequate assessment of group stakes 
requires attention to both a traditional perspective on what constitutes 
high or low stakes and a view derived from the group•s own perspective. 
- 30 -
The place of the philanthropic group was explicitly stated as being 
within the private sector. Accompanying this view was the thought that 
this approach was 11 the best defence of the free enterprise system. "19 
The desire to remain aloof from government aid has not been completely 
successful as noted earlier, yet the will to do so remains, and so, the 
philanthropic group has low stakes in civic government policy. 
Another interest area that seems to have low stakes was social need. 
With all three social need groups in the sample, there was an 
insignificant amount of funding coming from the city (under $3,000). In 
the first case, ie., the neighbourhood health clinics, there was no 
contact with the city on policy and past attempts to pursue funding of 
significance had run up against insurmountable administrative barriers. 
In the second case, ie., the native organization, attempts to influence 
city policy or to solicit help from the city administration had been 
abandoned for quite some time. The third group, ie., the community 
education group, was a newer organization, and their more recent attempts to 
influence city policy had taken the form of overt protest. The lack of 
funding and policy dialogue between the city and the social need groups did 
not result from any group~goals of autonomy from government, rather, in all 
three groups, senior governments played a major role. At the city level, 
concerns of the social need groups were not translated into policy and 
efforts to do so were often frustrated. The momentum needed to effect 
19 carter, page 88. 
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protests was insufficient, and so, groups in the social need area perceive 
the futility and discontinue efforts to influence urban policy. 
Presently, frustration has complicated the situation and therefore, it 
would be incorrect to conclude that stakes are either high or low. On the 
one hand contact with other governments imply high stakes. On the other 
hand, the political reality of unsuccessfulness regarding city policies 
means little contact with the city, but not necessarily low stakes. In a 
traditional sense, social need is considered to be peripheral to civic 
jurisdiction ~ stakes would be low. Given a change in the political will 
towards a more sympathetic attitude for social services, the stakes would be 
high in some specific areas, and moderate in relation to all civic policies 
proportional to government involvement. 
The economic stakes (eg., wages, benefits, and employment conditions) 
of the civic union employee are accepted as being high.20 Economic 
policies directly affecting the municipal union and non~economic policy 
were seen as having a significant relationship because of the possible 
consequences policy might have on the overall budget position of the city 
and several other aspects including changes to the composition of the 
workforce. In the Winnipeg case, the municipal union has actively 
participated in policy debates to argue against questionable management and 
costly patronage (eg., Harborview Golf Course, the case of Ritz Foods Ltd.). 
The concern is not simply wages and benefits. It includes addressing the 
20 zeigler, page 129 and Lineberry/Sharkansky [1978], page 106. 
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budgetary practices as a whole, and therefore, takes issue with a 
significant number of policy areas. Stakes in city policy, then, are high 
and there is validity in basing them on monetary considerations. 
The School Board originated as a special purpose body within the city 
council mandate and was later constituted as its own level of 
government.21 Since that time, the separation between the School Board 
and city council affairs has been complete to the point of having virtually 
no formal contact. The historical evolution of the city-Board relationship, 
then, has resulted in a situation within which stakes in city policies are 
low. The lack of Board~city exchanges did not preclude serious consequences 
resulting from policies in areas of urban development. Development policies 
were said to have already caused significant demographic changes which 
necessitated construction of new schools and closure of some established 
schools thus resulting in extra budget costs for the School Board. This 
aspect alone would imply high stakes for the School Board in the city•s land 
use policies, yet it should also be noted that the city and the School Board 
share the same tax base. Because the quality of education may be 
significantly affected by budgetary problems and because city policy may 
significantly affect the budget, the School Board has a high stake in civic 
policy. 
The stakes of the research group cannot be adequately understood on 
the basis of policy affect on the group•s own position, but rather should 
be viewed as derivative of the area of interest which was taken as the 
subject of research. That is, research groups were said to have an 
21 Higgins, page 106. 
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advocacy role, and therefore, a stake in policy. The relationship between 
policy and the group was indirect; the focus of researched reports was 
specific and touched upon few policy areas; and the bulk of group activity 
involved contract projects for clients. The lack of immediate or direct 
need to influence city policy is offset by the advocacy role, and so, some 
measure of stakes would correspond to research group involvement. 
Overall, the stake in city policy would be low to moderate. 
The neighbourhood development group was substantially funded by 
the federal government and might, therefore, be seen to have a high stake 
in government policy in general. There was income from the tri-level fund 
(CAI) previously mentioned, yet only insignificant amounts came directly 
from the city government (under $3,000). The areas of concern regarding 
city policy involved minor problems such as locations of crosswalks, lane 
lighting, and so on, and major problems such as zoning regulations and 
building inspections, both of which could affect the group•s building 
construction activities. The stakes in city policy were not 
insignificant, yet neither were they overbearing. In the traditional sense, 
neighbourhood associations that did not have an overt property tax concern 
would not have a legitimate stake even if protest were used. Stakes in the 
traditional sense, then, were not applicable. In the contemporary sense, 
stakes were moderate because activities required city cooperation in making 
zoning changes and addressing local problems. 
The stake that the senior's group has in civic policy has increased 
in the recent past because of the significance of city funding mentioned 
previously. The city•s contribution (13.2% of group revenue), while 
significant, would not threaten group survival. The interview revealed 
seniors• involvement in city policy from time-to-time. For example, 
seniors organized protest demonstrations to save an historic fire hall from 
demolition, yet examples indicate that concerns are isolated and not a 
factor in the well-being of the group itself. The stakes of seniors, then, 
were moderate. 
Finally, the business groups are traditionally viewed as having a 
high stake in city policy.22 Government is a direct client for business 
enterprise; city government policy is often central to business strategy 
especially regarding developers and real estate interests, and property 
taxes are important to the operating cost of most enterprises. The benefits 
for business are significantly altered by policy. This same pattern is 
present in Winnipeg and need not be explored further. Business stakes in 
civic policy are high. 
As examination of interest groups beyond the traditionally recognized 
interests (which tend to be restricted to business, unions, and ratepayers) 
shows quite divergent needs and goals. It would be inaccurate to make the 
conclusion that a group•s stake in civic policy correlates to its lobby 
activity or its position relative to the hierarchy of council favour. Nor 
should it be assumed that, because groups might be silent on city policy 
they are also not interested. Frustrated attempts to influence policy and 
inadequate political resources with which to affect influence are inhibiting 
22 Eulau, page 330 and Lineberry/Sharkansky, page 94 [1978]. 
~ 35 ~ 
factors. Criteria for assessment cannot be limited to monetary variables or 
other variables such as an interest in planning input because universal 
application across a representative sample of civic group actors is not 
possible. Research based on arbitrary universals that apply only half the 
time is easy and will indeed earn a just repute. Legitimacy cannot be 
adequately ascertained by falling back upon the profiles of those groups 
which have mustered strength enough to assert a civic presence and 
influence. Understanding group stakes requires attention to an 
understanding of unique group needs. Finally, the criteria of money as a 
determinant of stakes is, at best, inadequate, and, at worst, unjustifiably 
discriminatory. 
The act of exercising influence because of the presence of 
significant stakes is dependent only partly on political will. Many 
groups are very willing to influence policy, yet their ability to do so is 
hampered by a formidable political reality for which the bottom line is 
the unsympathetic decision~maker. Stakes, then, can only partially 
explain the high level of motivation of some groups and not others. The gap 
between a group•s ability to influence and actual policy output is displaced 
by the mold of elected personages---the decision makers or breakers. 
(ii) Communication: Modes and Access 
Within the range of communication modes, lobbying through 
presentations and solicitation of individual councillors was probably the 
most easily recognizable. Explanation is necessary for some other modes. 
The first three items in Table 2 regarding modes of communication mention 
linkages. The linkages in question include formalized channels of 
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communication between councillors, the administrators, and the interest 
groups, (eg., the collective agreement with unions, consultation with the 
Business Development Corporation, councillor•s membership to a group's Board 
of Directors), yet linkages go beyond this to include informal and social 
linkages such as the coffee meeting or a game of golf both of which were 
cited as frequently used for purposes of input to civic affairs. The 
highest level of this type of intimate exchange was the friendly call to the 
mayor•s office. 
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The use of informal linkages cannot be underestimated in the Winnipeg 
case. One interviewee noted that an observer from another city might have 
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difficulty comprehending the method for creating policy because of the 
comparative lack of formal structures. It was further noted that most 
city business took place in the small coffee meeting of two or three people. 
The trust and confidence demanded by the intimacy of such a mode narrowed 
the access to a select body of individuals who conformed to the prevailing 
legitimacy. At the high end of the intimacy scale were the executives of 
the philanthropic group and the dominant business group. 
Because the phone call to the mayor and coffee or golf with the 
relevant power broker emulate the most ideal environment for interest 
articulation, linkage techniques of a number of groups have been innovated 
to seek advantage using this model. The Boards of Directors of the 
dominant business group, the philanthropic group, and one of the research 
groups have been constituted to promote broad and in~depth linkage contact 
activity. The relevant term is networking. Essentially, Boards are large 
and, while retaining legitimacy through an elective process, individuals 
are selected by nominating committees on the basis of organizational and 
communication skills and the amount of power one is able to wield within 
the relevant spheres of influence. 
The most sophisticated Board belonged to the dominant business group 
which had assigned one Board member to each of the 29 councillors and the 
mayor. The Board was 30 strong and each member was expected to maintain a 
close liaison with the councillor assigned. The high level of attention 
to civic affairs through Board design strongly correlated to the high 
stakes evident in the business interests. The Philanthropic group used a 
much larger leadership contingent consisting of 15 table officers and 
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committee chairpersons, 31 Board members, and more than 200 committee 
members. Unlike the business group, attention to community integration 
was the theme of Board design for the philanthropic group. The research 
group had innovated to reflect both the council~group focus of business 
and the community~group focus of the philanthropic organizaton, yet 
interviews indicated a lower sense of legitimacy, (ie., a social research 
thrust as distinct from business interest), relative to prevailing council 
attitudes and an access point correspondingly lower on the intimacy scale 
(eg., the direct call to the mayor was not available). 
The practice of using large Boards selected for their powerful 
connections within the social structure worked to support interest group 
concerns at both the council level and very importantly at the power level 
below council. That is, excessively large committee structures are able 
to direct activities at multiple levels within specialized government 
departments and create community linkages between the elites of a multiple 
of institutional, group or community actors. Considerable elite based 
support may be wielded in this way. 
In the case of the municipal workers• union, the Board or Executive 
Council was 300 strong, yet the members were elected to the Board as 
representatives of worker shops. It was emphasized in the interview that 
the board was designed to enhance the representative democratic ethic and 
was not designed with attention to efficacy in power relationships with 
the city. Council was cited as being rarely sympathetic to worker 
concerns, and so, the capacity to establish a network of intimate linkages 
at that level was futile. Some committee work was in place in an effort 
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to link with various points within the city government administration, yet 
the same sentiments of disapproval of union concerns expressed by 
councillors was evident (from interviews) among civic administrators. The 
problem of legitimacy had caused the union to shift its patterns of policy 
influence towards reliance upon the formal structures of negotiating 
contracts. Interviews with civic labour relations officers, as well as 
union leaders, revealed a keen appreciation for cooperation within the 
adversarial environment of labour~management relations. Adversity, however, 
does not contribute to intimacy. 
More formal modes of communication took the form of traditionally 
popular lobby activity. That is, groups presented briefs to council, 
solicited the support of individual councillors, rallied public support, 
formed group liaisons to increase overall group clout, and resorted to 
avenues of political power open to them. The most frequent users of lobby 
techniques were the two groups with high stakes, ie., the civic union and 
business, and the social research group. 
Formality was the most notable distinction separating the linkage mode 
from lobby activity. Formal modes of interest articulation were open to all 
participants willing to put in the effort necessary to present their 
interest. Formality and public access were strongly correlated. It should 
be understood that formal input to policy making decisions placed 
information about group concerns, about opposing concerns, and about 
public~at-large concerns before councillors. Whereas the coffee meeting 
used dialogue to work out problems, formality reduces opportunities to 
shape relationships between the city and interest areas and reduces 
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decisions to simple acceptance or rejection outcomes. Those groups, ie., 
unions, social need groups, the school board, and the neighbourhood 
development corporation, to whom intimacy of access was relatively 
unavailable could not expect automatically favourable responses or, where 
favourable responses were forthcoming, complete and acceptable responses. 
No matter how high stakes were, policy outcomes would be less satisfactory 
than policy outcomes for groups having access through intimate contact, at 
least because dialogue was diminished and, at most because adversity 
created council resistance. 
The remaining mode of communication was protest. In one theoretical 
analysis, protest is seen as a consequence of overtly hostile actions on 
the part of a group whose interest is considered illegitimate. In another 
analysis, protest is the last resort of a group whose concerns have been 
subject to the unresponsiveness of decision-makers and yet are sufficiently 
important to prompt such drastic measures. 
The use of protest was evident with unions, one social need group, 
and seniors. Alienation from civic affairs was most evident in the 
responses of the social need group. There were no established channels 
for dialogue about group concerns and little on~going involvement using 
formal methods. The frequency of contact with the city government was low 
and contributed to a general sense of illegitimacy of interests. The 
group in question served a constituency base of some of the lowest 
socio~economic groups in Winnipeg. Further, the subliminal, if not overt, 
political~ideological perspective of the group favoured citizen 
involvement of a non~elite lower class as opposed to the perspective of 
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council which was basically rightist upper~middle class. That is, 
ideological conflict complicated the group-civic relationship. 
City employees in the United States are recognized as a powerful 
interest group in urban politics because they have important stakes in 
policy outcomes. Their livelihoods are determined by city policies. Also, 
they possess important resources. These recourses stem primarily from the 
collective bargaining process. Municipal employees could be a potent 
electoral block, and elected officials seem to be sensitive to their 
potential influence on civic elections. Unlike business corporations 
municipalities are non profit corporations that negotiate wage settlements 
with their employees without much constraint of balancing budgets. In 
recent years, however, as more cities have experienced fiscal problems, 
elected officials have adopted fiscal austerity measures and have taken a 
tougher stand on wage settlements with employees. 
In the case of the municipal employee union in Winnipeg, the formal 
structure of collective bargaining was long established. The strike threat 
and the obvious inconvenience of such action necessitated a city stake in 
labour relations. Interviews indicated thoughtful use of protest actions 
including petitions, demonstrations at council meetings, and use of press 
releases with strategic considerations of stirring up public attention and 
support. The union would resort to such actions after normal channels of 
communication yielded only negative results, provided the issue was 
significant enough to generate protest action. While of occasional value to 
the union, protest was infrequent and insignificant relative to the volume 
of on~going communication. The significant protest event in the 
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past decade on the issue of contracting~out to the private sector, 
crystalized ideological polarity-- hard~line right versus left. The use of 
protest action is unlikely in the absence of hardened and opposing stands 
taken by the city. 
In the case of the Senior Citizen group, protest was not a consequence 
of polarity or illegitimacy. The incidents of protest concerned issues 
which may be seen as much more isolated from normal relationships than 
issues of contention regarding the union or the social need group. The one 
available example involved possible demolition of a neighbourhood firehall. 
For aesthetic and sentimental reasons, the will to save the building was 
sufficiently strong to create protest action in the face of seemingly 
resolute policy. Realistically, City Council response was indicative more 
of the halting speed of process than that of intent to overrule seniors• 
wishes. The City Council did not demolish. The event did not threaten 
group well~being in any way and was perceived by its participants as a 
friendly gesture of persuasion. Protest was the rare exception to the 
pattern of general favour on the part of council towards seniors. 
In conclusion, the patterns of communication indicate three forums, 
namely informal linkages, formal representation, and protest. Access to 
the most intimate modes at the highest levels were restricted to the 
executives of the dominant business group and the philantrophic 
organization. Board designs attempted to facilitate intimate interactions 
over a wide range of power loci including councillors, the administrators, 
the private establishment, other groups, and so on. The formalized 
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structures of communication, ie., lobby activity, were open to the public, 
yet reduced opportunities for dialogue. Where protest arose, the elements 
of ideological polarity and perceived illegitimacy were usually present. 
Protest was not relevant to business interests, but was evident in the 
practice of unions, social need groups, and, to a lesser extent seniors. 
Analysis of the modes of communication show consistency with previous 
evidence and the literature; that is, business interests occupy a 
privileged position of power and other interests are not viewed as having 
similarly high levels of legitimacy. 
Based on the evidence presented thus far, let us try to answer the 
questions raised earlier in this study. First, is the position of the 
business groups privileged and are other groups ignored by city council? 
Funding arrangements and communication linkages show that business 
occupies a position unavailable to other groups. Privilege in funding is 
extended to the elderly as well as business; and intimacy of communication 
is available to the philanthropic group as well as business. Business does 
not have exclusive privilege in the areas of funding and communication, yet 
the range of privilege is widest for business than any other group. 
Measures of which groups are ignored by council is more difficult 
than determining which groups have favour because of the inherent inertia. 
If funding is used as the criteria, only business and the elderly were not 
ignored. The use of communications as a measurement criteria is 
complicated because groups may use public forums over which council has 
little means with which to prevent a group from being heard. On the basis 
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of the presence of communication through protest, unions and social need 
groups (seniors excepted) are subject to council disfavour. The emerging 
pattern which indicated a pro-business, pro-elderly and pro-charity (re: 
philanthropic group) attitude and an anti-labour, anti-social agency 
attitude is consistent with the findings of previous research. 
Second, is there a positive correlation between a favourable group 
relationship with civic officials and intimate modes of communication? 
The two groups having access to intimate contact were the philanthropic 
group and the business group. While intimate contact in itself is 
indicative of a favourable relationship, a more substantive indicator is 
funding. In the case of the philanthrophic group explicit objectives 
attempted to avoid acceptance of government funding in order to preserve 
the private sector aspect. In the case of the business group, funding 
from city government was significant (salaries and expenses of nine 
professional employees), and so, intimacy and favour did correlate. The 
hypothesis is valid on the basis of the correlation of intimacy and 
funding once qualified for the exceptional case. 
Third, is there a correlation between groups that use protest and 
city council disfavour? For unions and social need agencies this question 
has already been answered in the affirmative. In the case of the elderly, 
it must be recognized that while protest is evident, disfavour was not. 
The hypothesis is refuted on this basis. An analysis in greater depth is 
needed to explain more about the pattern of protest and disfavour. 
On the part of unions and the social agency, protest is more 
indicative of a symptom of a normally latent conflict that has become 
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manifest. Seniors' protest springs not from any norm of conflict, rather 
it is a demonstration of civic duty where Council is reminded that not all 
of its decisions are correct. The hypothesis, then, needs to be modified 
to test the correlation between favour and the legitimacy of group 
interest. Protest has a partial role to play in explaining the relation 
between the city and urban groups, yet must be used in conjunction with 
other indicators such as legitimacy, conflict, and the presence of civic 
duty. Protest may be used to explain the city~group relationship in some 
cases. 
Fourth, a further question was raised in regard to the frequency of 
the use of lobby activity. 23 Is there a correlation between freqeuncy 
of lobby activities and access to intimate communication? From Table 2 on 
modes of communication, one of the two groups to which intimate contact was 
available lobbied frequently (business) and the other lobbied only 
infrequently (philanthropic group). Of the three groups to which intimate 
contact with local government was available to a limited extent (seniors, 
research, and political parties), one group lobbied frequently, another 
infrequently, and a third lobbied sometimes. In reviewing the other end of 
the scale, ie., those groups where protest was used, a full range of 
frequency characteristic was in evidence. There was, then, no correlation 
between the frequency of use of the lobby forum and either access to 
intimate modes of communication or the resort to protest. 
23 The indicators used refer to the frequency of making presentations 
and briefs to council on its committees and frequency of 
solicitation of individual councillors. 
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V. CASE STUDIES 
A. Urban Research 
As we have reviewed the more salient universal variables (funding, 
stakes, and communications) in the city~group relationship, we will now 
turn towards the salient uniquenesses concerning the city and individual 
groups. 
To begin, the city government does not fund either research group, 
rather the city~research group relationship has involved the awarding of 
contracts. The city government views the two research groups as they 
would any other research consultant and has chosen not to extend 
preference. At best, the groups take the chance of winning in 
competitions by submitting the lowest bid. A second dimension to the 
relation involves the subject of research. Both groups have, at times, 
taken advocacy roles in issues of public concern which conflict with goals 
of the city. The prestige of professional research institutions and the 
strength of arguments has worked on occasion to embarass civic officials. 
It is not in the self~interest of civic officials, therefore, to lend 
support. 
The role of the research groups has not been constant. At one time 
or another, roles have included: advocacy, contract work, coordination of 
public education, government consultant, social agency consultant, and 
involvement with an urban university program. The University affiliation 
and the emphasis on contract projects were innovations to group roles 
necessitated by the problems associated with funding. Survival of the 
institutions was precarious, and in one case, had reached critical 
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proportion. The need to innovate had its consequences on operations. In 
the group whose financial difficulties were acute at one critical stage, 
staff was pared to the minimum leaving only the Director and a part~time 
researcher. Output was reduced to specific contracts; survival rested on 
cultivation of the university program; and other roles were dropped. The 
consequences for the other group were more subtle and were linked to the 
funding relationship. For example, consultant work could be obtained for 
projects sponsored by social service agenices which were funded by 
provincial or federal government. That is, funding was indirectly 
available from government and the type of research was directly determined 
by the contracting agency. The bulk of direct funding originated with 
private philanthropic agencies whose ties with civic officials, tradition, 
and the ruling establishment were close, and therefore, influenced the 
bias of research activity. That is, detached roles were assumed in favour 
of actual group involvement in sensitive areas that might disturb the 
status quo and the topics of research were skewed away from controversial 
issues. The dominant factor determining the role of the research group 
was the funding source. 
Whereas, funding had been available from both senior governments 
(CMHC in the federal case) and private contributing agencies, each 
individual source had its narrowed perspective which influenced the flow 
of money, and thereby, output. The city was not a participant, the reason 
for which may be partly linked to the research group's inherently critical 
role in the urban polity. The diversity of funding sources and the lack 
of any substantive commitment to urban research forces the research groups 
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to work in areas compatible with the conditions of funding. Unfortunately, 
this ad hoc scenario prevents coordination within or between the research 
groups. If the funding for urban research were channeled through a central 
board having representation of both groups in cooperation, the needs for 
urban research could be assessed and priorities could be determined. An 
element of diversity on such a board could serve to insulate urban research 
from the political wills of governments having ideologically opposing 
viewpoints. With sufficient attention to patterns of networking this same 
board could be effective in bringing the city government into the process. 
The work of the independant research groups has had positive effect 
on civic life if not on civic officials' attitudes. Institutionalizing a 
more coordinated approach to funding could lead to better serving of 
research needs and greater involvement of the city government through 
joint funding schemes and through pressure on the city to expedite urban 
policy, planning and action. 
B. Problems of Planning In Isolation: The School Board 
A brief sketch of the School Boards• problem was presented in the 
discussion on stakes. It was noted that city development activities could 
seriously affect the School Board's budget in an undesirable way. Land 
use planning is a city responsibility. Where the city approves 
construction of residential neighbourhoods and housing projects, demands 
for schools follow. Land purchases and building construction costs for new 
schools as well as the accompanying on~going operational costs are factors 
which extend the board•s financial resources. In Winnipeg where 
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growth is small and stable,24 migration to new neighbourhoods causes 
reduction of the population of school age children in the established 
schools, and thereby precipitates the need to either close schools or 
maintain schools on an inefficient cost~benefit basis. A further problem 
arises from the transportation of children from neighbourhoods where 
schools have closed or neighbourhoods where there are school~age children 
in numbers too small to permit the feasible construction of a new school. 
The board, in these instances, must shoulder the responsibility of 
providing bus services. Public transit is an option that has been used 
where possible, yet in many new residential developments service is 
inadequate or there is a need to make several bus transfers. The board is 
often required to supply bus service of its own. Each of the above 
problems is costly to the tax payer and stems from inadequacies in 
planning rationale. 
Since the time of the School Board's separation from the city, the 
city's role has been confined to that of tax collector. The decisions 
regarding the size of the Board levy remain with the Board, yet the fact 
that both the city and the Board share the identical property tax base is 
quite significant. The rising cost of maintaining public services and 
supplying new services is an accepted fact in our society and the burden 
rests with the taxpayer. The tax revenue potential from the property tax 
is finite. When the grumblings of discontented taxpayers is heard loudly 
enough, politicians will perceive the fulfillment of revenue potential and 
24 The total population growth from 1976 to 1981 was 0.6% and from 
1971 to 1981 0.46%. Figures from Canada Census data. 
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one could expect competition between the city and the Board for a larger 
share of a shrinking pie. The operating budget estimates for 1983 were 
$409,683,379 for the city and $183,991,422 for the School Board. The 
School Board share was 31%. 
The cost of planning by the city government to the exclusion of the 
School Board might be avoided by establishing a better working relationship 
now. The almost absolute separation between the Board and the City is not 
conducive to cooperation and needs to be reassessed. Currently, the need to 
establish a School Board presence in the process of city development 
planning would help to alleviate the immediate problems related to 
demographic change. This relationship, if combined with a sincere political 
will to cooperate, should result in the best situation for both those 
receiving services and those paying for them. 
VI. THE POLITICAL MILIEU 
Thus far, it is clear that the current civic policy process lends 
favour to some and not others. The ultimate power of decision rests in 
the hands of civic councillors who have been documented as displaying 
significant homogeneity over a range of SES variables and who do not 
reflect the full range of characteristics present in the electorate. The 
pattern of their policy preferences in favour of business and against 
unions and social services is evident in the Winnipeg case. Political 
values of the right are unmistakable and have serious implications for the 
distribution of city government resources, the quality of society, and the 
well~being of interest groups. Reasons why this group has enjoyed 
consistent support and long~term dominance should be explored. We will turn 
to the electoral process for our answers. Three features of election 
patterns were salient to these questions: voting patterns, political party 
activity, and innovations to civic elections. 
A. Political Participation And Upper~Class Bias 
The Canadian civic polity has a long~term average voter turnout rate 
of 35% and, in the United States the turnout is 31%.25 In the Canadian 
case, the same electorate will turnout at a rate of 66% to 75% in senior 
government elections.26 Who participates? 
Lineberry and Sharkansky (1978) indicate that ratepayers, because 
they pay taxes, have a high stake in civic affairs, and are, therefore, 
~~ Lineberry/Sharkansky, page 53 [1971]. 
Higgins, page 246. 
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more likely to participate in elections.27 Jerry Hough (1970) adds 
weight to this conclusion by outlining the historical eligibility of the 
electorate whose franchise was traditionally confined to property 
owners.28 The immediate distinction in between those able to afford 
property and the non~owners who, in the past, were excluded from voting 
participation. Hough breaks down the socio~economic characteristics of the 
civic electorate by education, assessed house value, assessed value of 
rented premises, and occupation, and in each category participation was 
higher with higher affluence.29 The "high~high" and "low~low" 
relationships between activism and status pertain.30 ooes the Winnipeg 
civic electorate display similar upper-class bias? 
In assessing the Winnipeg case for SES comparisons and voter turnout, 
two city neighbourhoods were selected~ Lord Roberts and Point Road. 31 
Their geographical boundaries were sufficiently correspondent with 
census tract boundaries (CT002, CT503) after some adjustment was made for 
deviations in poll boundaries to be accurate for the purposes of this 
study. SES data, then, was taken from the 1981 census using education 
indicators, (ie., percentage of area residents having completed a 
university degree and percentage having reached grades (9~13), household 
~~ Lineberry/Sharkansky, page 94 [1978]. 
29 Hough, page 287. Hough, page 288. 
30 Lineberry/Sharkansky, page 93. 
31 For the purposes of this study, reference wi 11 be made to the "Point 
Road" city neighbourhood. "Point Road" here includes Point Road, 
Wildwood, and Crescent Park (north of Dowker Avenuer) neighbourhoods. 
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income, and the occupant's estimated value of the residence. The average 
voter turnout was calculated using civic election results of those polls 
relevant to the census tract area.32 The total eligible number of voters 
was not available from the poll data, yet a reasonable estimate was 
obtained by using the total number of persons of voting age as reported by 
the census data. Adjustment was made for ineligible voters. It was felt 
that because the adjusted figure for eligible voters for the city-as-a-whole 
was within 6.0% (1.7% difference between adjusted 1981 census data and 1983 
reported number of eligible city voters and 5.3% for 1977 election and 1976 
census data), the average turnout calculation was sufficiently 
accurate.33 The calculations made for city-as-a-whole turnout using 
census data for eligible voters resulted in insignificant differences when 
compared to calculations using actually reported numbers of eligible voters. 
It would have been more suitable had poll data included total eligible 
voters, yet the alternative described above was felt to be sufficiently 
accurate. 
32 The polls used in CT2 (Lord Roberts) included numbers 617, 618, 627 to 
633, 640 to 646. the polls used in CT502 (Fort Garry) included numbers 
33 to 44. Data were issued by the civic election authority. 33 Normally, had data indicated the total number of eligible voters by 
poll, such data would be used and considered sufficiently 
accurate. Some question arises regarding the accuracy of total 
voters reported by enumerators because of missed persons or 
dwellings. As neither source (reported or Census data) is 
infallible, it was deemed that a difference under 10% was within 
tolerable limits. 
SES Indicators 
Education: 
# Holding a University 
Degree 
# Having grade 9~13 
Houshold Income 
Value of Dwelling 
~ 55 ~ 
TABLE 3 
INDICATORS OF AFFLUENCE 
(CT002) 
Lord 
Winnipeg Roberts 
9.6 7.0 
42.1 42.1 
23208 19217 
58866 39663 
( CT503) 
Point 
Road 
24.7 
31.6 
31879 
69033 
Table 3 on SES indicators was compared to city data for the 
purposes of establishing the relative level of affluence. In the Lord 
Roberts neighbourhood, the percentage of people having a university degree 
was 7.0% or 2.6% below the city average, while the percentage having 
achieved grades 9 to 13 was the same as the city as a whole. Average 
household income was $4,000 lower than the city average and the average 
value of the occupied dwelling was $19,203 below the city average of 
$58,866. Lord Roberts, then, showed attributes of a neighbourhood of 
below average affluence: In the second neighbourhood, ie., Point Road, the 
percentage of persons holding a university degree was 24.7% or 15.1% above 
average. The total persons having achieved grades 9~13 was 31.6% or 10.5% 
below average. Household income was $31,879, as compared to the city 
average of $23,208, and the average dwelling value was $10,169 above 
average. The Point Road neighbourhood was of significantly above average 
affluence. 
Voter Turnout 
Average Turnout 1977 
~ Electoral Data 
~ Census Data 
Average Turnout 1980 
~ Electoral Data 
- Census Data 
Average Turnout 1983 
- Electoral Data 
~ Census Data 
TABLE 4 
VOTER TURNOUT 
(CT002) 
Winnipeg Lord Roberts 
38.0* 42.0% 
39 .6** 
36.3 38.1 
38.1 
51.8 33.4 
52.6 
( CT503) 
Point Road 
60.5% 
58.1 
68.4 
**turnout is calculated using actual reported numbers of eligible voters 
*turnout is calculated using adjusted census data to determine eligible 
number of voters 
The voter turnout results of the two neighbourhoods show quite 
different patterns. The range of turnout for the neighbourhood of below 
average affluence was 33.4% to 42.0% which (with the exception of the 1983 
election) was quite close to data for the city as a whole. In the 
significantly above average affluent neighbourhoods, turnout ranged from 
58.1% to 68.4%. In the 1977 and 1980 elections, the turnout averaged 
20.5% higher than the city averages of the same years. The high-high, 
low-low, relationship between affluence and participation reported by 
Patrick Moynihan (see, Lineberry and Sharkansky, 1978) was evident in the 
Winnipeg case. 
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B. Partisanship and Innovations in Civic Elections 
Although one would expect that a political party would contribute 
substantially to increasing voter turnout, better awareness of issues, and 
to providing an outlet for policy interests, there is an acute lack of 
literature directed to the question of the raison d'etre of the local 
civic party in Canada. The question is answered partially in American 
sources: partisan elections lead to setting up constitutency offices and 
ward associations, more direct contact with officials, and greater frequency 
of contact;34 the voter is better informed, costs of elections are 
reduced, party labels clarify policy directions, the party involves more 
participants, and issues are organized.35 
Party activity at the local level in the past decade has led to 
their increasing relevance, and so, this area needs exploration. Higgins 
(1977) sketches two types of parties at the local level. First, he refers 
to the "civic part/' which is specific to only one municipality, is rooted 
in the business reform era, attempts to keep "politics" out of civic 
affairs, professes not to be a political party, advocates administrative 
control through the city manager, is sometimes dominanted by business, is 
small in membership, yet powerful in controlling nominations for office, 
and is susceptible to internal divisions. There is a lack of explicit and 
unifying ideology and the group tends to be largely an election phenomenon 
that dissipates after voting day. Their usual slogan is "good, efficient, 
economical civic management. n36 
34 Banfield/Wilson, page 161. ~~ Lineberry/Sharkansky, page 85, 86 [1971]. 
Higgins, page 227-230. 
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The second party type is that of the established national political 
party which has opted to enter the urban area. National party activity is 
rare, one reason for which has been a lack of interest on the part of the 
party itself.37 What interest there is usually stems from the left, 
ie., CCF and NDP, although the Toronto Liberals made the effort in 1969. 
Higgins advocates that because of contemporary trends of urbanization, 
city reorganization, expanded city activities, and longer term decision 
making, major parties now have a higher stake in city government.38 In 
Winnipeg, changes to the City of Winnipeg Act regarding amalgamation of 
surrounding municipalities included intent to set up a parliamentary form 
of government which would have necessitated party, yet the actual 
legislation excluded a council-elected mayor which thus emasculated party 
leadership. The lack of success which Higgins refers to in the case of 
Toronto, seems to have resulted in a temporary withdrawal. More recent 
events, however, include renewed activity of the left and NDP parties and 
some advances in Vancouver, Toronto, Hamilton, and Montreal as well as 
smaller centres. 
The party in itself constitutes a significant innovation to urban 
government. Although Higgins indicates that party activity had little 
effect on voter turnout,39 American literature supports the view that 
the non-partisan election reduced voter turnout in Democratic Party 
precincts, but has little affect on Republican precincts.40 In this 
3 7 . . 237 
38 H1gg1ns, page • 
39 Higgins, page 237. Higgins, page 240. 
40 sanfield/Wilson, page 159. 
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same study, Banfield and Wilson infer that the non~partisan election 
favours those candidates of well-to-do status.41 Lineberry and 
Sharkansky {1971) also observe that the non-partisan election attracts 
larger proportions of middle and upper class voters and smaller 
proportions of working class voters. 
Very similar consequences result from the innovation of at~large 
elections. That is, turnout is reduced, upper class bias occurs, voter 
information is reduced, and candidates become more distant from the 
electorate. Winnipeg civic elections use the ward system, and not 
at~large elections, therefore, questions in this area cannot be explored. 
Questions concerning partisan activity, however, have increased in 
Winnipeg•s October 1983 election. 
The Winnipeg civic election of October 1983 was uncharacteristic of the 
usual civic election. The events leading up to voting day began with the 
unprecedented rally of NDP party activists at their municipal party 
convention in November of 1982. From this convention was derived a set of 
policies, the framework for election strategy, and a strong optimism towards 
the possibilities of electoral success. The NDP was the only established 
party to have openly and aggressively campaigned using the party label. The 
Conservative party was inactive in the election; the Liberal Party offered 
some support for candidates that carried the Liberal card. The recognizable 
11 Civic .. party, the Independant Citizen•s Election Committee (ICEC), which 
41 sanfield/Wilson, page 160. 
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had been in control of city hall under one label or another since 1919,42 
became alarmed at the resolve of the NDP. Being fearful of being held up 
for their questionable record in a real election contest, the ICEC attempted 
to kill the element of partisanship in the civic election by announcing 
their dissolution on July 21st, 1983. The move effectively removed the 
opportunity to vote against the ICEC even though all the incumbent ICEC 
candidates ran in 1983. 
Complementary to the party activation/deactivation were two rather 
highly popular referenda, one on nuclear disarmament and the other on the 
French language debate. The former was initially perceived as being a 
voter turnout stimulant in favour of the progressive civic forces of the 
left---the NDP; and the latter was undoubtedly a focal point upon which 
the anti-French sentiment could rally to express their rejection of what 
was perceived to be expansionism of Francophone cultural dominance being 
promoted by the provincial NDP. The issue was not a city matter, yet the 
right-wing, or more descriptively the reactionary, forces on Winnipeg 
Council and many of the rural councils which were also up for election, 
supported the plebiscite. A very good case could be made for simple 
pragmatic electoral manipulation directed at hurting the NDP (at the 
expense of the French in Manitoba and Canada). The outcome was no 
surprise---reaction was drawn to the polls and the citizens of Winnipeg 
voted 76.5% against the perceived pro-language rights position. 
The complexity of influences that descended upon the 1983 civic 
election make analysis about party affect on voter turnout unreasonably 
42 Rea Report 1976. 
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difficult. The French language plebiscite had very distinct consequences. 
In the Lord Roberts neighbourhood, which voted 63.9% for the provincial 
NDP in 1981 and was never below 50% pro-NDP support in the past three 
provincial contests and normally turned out at a rate of 40% in civic 
elections, dropped in turnout in the 1983 election by approximately 7%. 
Conversely, the Point Road neighbourhood which voted 65% plus in favour of 
the Conservatives in the past two provincial elections, turned out 68.4% 
in October of 1983 for an increase of approximately 9%. The drop in the 
turnout of NDP voters and the increase in the turnout of right-wing voters 
is not consistent with the expected outcome of increased party activity 
which should have been an increase in turnout for both camps. 
Overall the voter turnout increased from an average 38-39% city-wide 
to 52.6% (as reported by the Chief Returning Officer). The language 
plebiscite was probably the most dominant direct factor in producing the 
increased turnout. The results are too obscured to adequately validate 
conclusions about the prospects of party activity in Winnipeg. 
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The dynamics of the organized interest groups in Winnipeg deserves 
further research and this exploratory study suggests that there was an 
ideological split between the right and the left. On the right, favour, 
as determined by funding and intimacy of communication went to the 
privileged, namely business, and to a lesser extent, the charitable, 
namely the philanthropic group and the elderly. On the left, there was no 
evidence of city funding of any consequence and no easy access to the 
power elite. Minority groups, the low income classes, community based 
social services agencies, the municipal employees and research groups were 
not recipients of civic favour according to the criteria of funding and 
communications. Outside of the ideology of right and left, (or so it is 
hoped), some institutions such as research groups and the school board might 
have a good case for a close relationship with the city, but such has not 
been the case. 
The pattern of right~left politics at Winnipeg City Hall is further 
supported from an analysis of all groups receiving city money43. An 
interesting finding supporting the Right-wing ideological basis of civic 
decisions was an allocation of $15,000 Special Grants to the Progessive 
Conservative Party. No other political party was listed as recipient of 
city money. 
43 Assessment of the City of Winnipeg's commitment to group funding 
is based on the ''authorized" postions of "Special Grants" to December, 
1983. A list of groups receiving more than $10,000 from 
the city is provided in Appendix {iii). 
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Of the traditionally elite-oriented cultural groups, the Art Gallery 
accounted for $1 out of $5 spent on special grants. The Art Gallery, 
Rainbow Stage, the Ballet, and Symphony accounted for 39.9% of all special 
grants. Such organizations as Osborne House (for battered women) and Klinic 
(a community health group) did not make it to the list of special grants 
recipients. The Native Alcoholism Council of Manitoba got $4,000, while the 
Men's Music Club received $13,3000. 
Winnipeg is not a good example of an integrated, city community i.e. 
too many legitimate concerns are left out of the mainstream of civic policy 
affairs. There is evidence of social, community-oriented leadership from 
both senior levels of government, yet, in view of the directions taken by 
these other levels of governments, the city council's perception of the 
range of its legitimate responsibilities is narrow. There is not enough 
evidence to assert that the city has a concern for all of its constituent 
groups. 
Favour, privilege, and charity, evident in city funding and 
communications, do not attend to the need for fairness. Being fair in 
Winnipeg will mean that councillors will have to rise above ideological 
bias and recognize the legitimate interests of more groups than those to 
which they themselves hold partisan sentiment. 
More importantly, it is the electorate who should organize and 
influence urban policy. The research evidence confirms a state of 
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injustice similar to the Winnipeg case throughout North America and for 
the past 100 years at least. Our democracy has come out of the age of 
privileged voter eligibility based on property wealth, but relationships 
reflected in policy approaches remain very much the same. 
Patterns of voter participation evident in the results of civic 
elections show that city government is elected by a numerical minority of 
eligible voters. That minority is skewed to the upper class. 
Unfortunately, the imbalance in the electorate produces a similar imbalance 
in representation at the city council, and thereby the disadvantaged groups 
and their interests are not normally part of the urban decision~making 
system. This situation calls for a re~examination of the civic electoral 
process. 
It should be noted that the interest group system though useful in some 
ways is not always representative of the public at large. Some people with 
adequate resources are more likely to get together and organize than others. 
Some interests tend to be omitted from the urban policy process because the 
groups representing them are often not well organized, or because they lack 
resources. For example, the poor or minority groups are less likely to 
organize. If they are organized they may suffer from lack of resources. 
Consequently, they are less likely to be represented in the urban policy 
process. The interest group system is biased toward those who do organize 
and possess sufficient resources and legitimacy. 
Democratic political structure is based on the freedom to organize. If 
politicians have no desire to respond to a wide spectrum of interest groups 
then that freedom is extremely restricted. Elected officials-- mayors, 
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councillors-- should not pay attention to a few interest groups alone 
neglecting a large number of interests, if urban democracy is to have 
meaning and representation of all sectors of the community. 
~ 66 ~ 
Appendix ( i) 
University of Winnipeg 
URBAN COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS 
Background Information 
1. a) Name of Organization 
b) Adress: 
c) Phone: 
2. Purpose/Goals: 
3. Functions/Services: 
4. Constituency: 
Social Base: Who does the group represent? Whose interests does it 
serve. 
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Class Age 
Ethnic Group Locale 
Sex Subculture/Life Style 
Geographic concentration vs. dispersion 
5. Size: 
Formal membership? 
How many members do you have? 
Volunteers? 
Staff? 
6. Formal Structure: 
a) Board of Directors Composition: 
Number Class 
Ethnicity Age 
Sex 
b) How selected: a) Nomination 
b) Election 
c) Appointment 
Duration: 
Responsibilities: 
- ~ -
c) Forms of Out Reach: a) Newsletter 
b) Open Meetings 
c) Media 
d) Other 
d) Sources of support: a) Government 
b) Non-governmental 
c) Public 
d) Financial 
e) Technical 
f) Ideological 
7. Community Context: 
a) How well is the organization known in the community? 
b) What segment of the community does it represent? 
c) Current Issues 
d) Is it involved (directly or indirectly) in civic elections, urban 
policy, or service delivery? 
e) How, in what way? 
f) As an urban organization is it concerned with urban development, 
planning, policy, service delivery, etc.? 
- ~ -
8. General Comments/Suggestions/Expectations - Issues, etc. re: urban 
policy and services: 
9. Organization's Spokesperson: 
Date: 
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Appendix (ii} 
FISCAL AUSTERITY AND URBAN INNOVATIONS 
INFORMATION FROM CITY MAYORS 
PART 1. FISCAL POLICIES 
Q1 In the last three years how important was the professional staff as 
compared to elected officials in affecting the overall spending level 
of you city government? (Circle one number) 
1 PROFESSIONAL STAFF LARGELY SET LEVEL 
2 PROFESSIONAL STAFF SUGGEST APPROXIMATE LEVEL 
3 PROFESSIONAL STAFF AND ELECTED OFFICIALS INCLUDING MAYOR HAVE ABOUT 
EQUAL INPUT IN SETTING LEVEL 
4 ELECTED OFFICIALS SET APPROXIMATE LEVEL 
5 ELECTED OFFICIALS LARGELY SET LEVEL 
6 FEW ANNUAL CHANGES, PAST PATTERNS USUALLY FOLLOWED INCREMENTALLY 
7 DON•T KNOW/NOT APPLICABLE 
Q2 How about in allocating funds among departments? {Circle one number) 
1 PROFESSIONAL STAFF LARGELY SET ALLOCATIONS 
2 PROFESSIONAL STAFF SET APPROXIMATE ALLOCATIONS 
3 PROFESSIONAL STAFF AND ELECTED OFFICIALS HAVE ABOUT EQUAL INPUT IN 
SETTING LEVEL 
4 ELECTED OFFICIALS SET APPROXIMATE ALLOCATIONS 
5 ELECTED OFFICIALS LARGELY SET ALLOCATIONS 
6 FEW ANNUAL CHANGES, PAST PATTERNS USUALLY FOLLOWED INCREMENTALLY 
7 DON'T KNOW/NOT APPLICABLE 
Q3 How about in developing new fiscal management strategies, such as 
imposing user charges for swimming or contracting out for services like 
garbage collection? (Circle one number) 
1 PROFESSIONAL STAFF LARGELY DECIDE 
2 PROFESSIONAL STAFF OFTEN DECIDE 
3 PROFESSIONAL STAFF AND ELECTED OFFICIALS HAVE ABOUT EQUAL INPUT IN 
DEVELOPING NEW STRATEGIES 
4 ELECTED OFFICIALS OFTEN DECIDE 
5 ELECTED OFFICIALS LARGELY DECIDE 
6 DON'T KNOW/NOT APPLICABLE 
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Q4 Please indicate your own preferences about spending. Circle 
one of the six answers for each of the 13 policy areas. 
1 Spend a lot less on services provided by the city 
2 Spend somewnat less 
3 Spend the same as is now spent 
4 Spend somewhat more 
5 Spend a lot more 
OK Don•t know/not applicable 
POLICY AREAS 
1. ALL AREAS OF CITY GOVERNMENT 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
2. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
3. SOCIAL WELFARE 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
4. STREETS AND PARKING 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
5. MASS TRANSPORTATION 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
6. PUBLIC HEALTH AND HOSPITALS 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
7. PARKS AND RECREATION 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
8. LOW-INCOME HOUSING 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
9. POLICE PROTECTION 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
10. FIRE PROTECTION 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
11. CAPITAL STOCK (e.g. ROADS, 
SEWERS, ETC. ) 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
12. NUMBER OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
13. SALARIES OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
Q5 Please estimate the preference of the majority of voters in your city. 
Again, circle one of the six answers for each policy area. 
1 Spend a lot less on services provided by the city 
2 Spend somewnat less 
3 Spend the same as is now spent 
4 Spend somewhat more 
5 Spend a 1 ot more 
OK Don•t know/not applicable 
Po 1 icy Areas 
1. ALL AREAS OF CITY GOVERNMENT 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
2. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
3. SOCIAL WELFARE 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
4. STREETS AND PARKING 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
5. MASS TRANSPORTATION 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
6. PUBLIC HEALTH AND HOSPITALS 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
7. PARKS AND RECREATION 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
8. LOW-INCOME HOUSING 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
9. POLICE PROTECTION 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
10. FIRE PROTECTION 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
11. CAPITAL STOCK (e.g. ROADS, 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
SEWERS, ETC. ) 
12. NUMBER OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
13. SALARIES OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
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Q6 Please indicate how successful you have been in implementing your own 
spending preferences in this term of office. 
answers for each policy area. 
Circle one of the s1x 
1 Very successful 
2 Somewhat successful 
3 Somewhat unsuccessful 
4 Very unsuccessful 
5 The policy is not in the jurisdiction of the city government 
OK Don•t know/not applicable 
Policy Areas 
1. ALL AREAS OF CITY GOVERNMENT 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
2. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
3. SOCIAL WELFARE 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
4. STREETS AND PARKING 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
5. MASS TRANSPORTATION 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
6. PUBLIC HEALTH AND HOSPITALS 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
7. PARKS AND RECREATION 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
8. LOW~INCOME HOUSING 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
9. POLICE PROTECTION 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
10. FIRE PROTECTION 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
11. CAPITAL STOCK (e.g. ROADS, 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
SEWERS, ETC.) 
12. NUMBER OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
13. SALARIES OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
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PART II. PARTICIPANTS 
Q7 Please indicate your judgment about the spending preferences of several 
participants in city government affairs. Circle one of the six answers 
for each of the types of participants. Does the participant want to 
1 Spend a lot less on services provided by the city 
2 Spend somewhat 1ess 
3 Spend the same as is now spent 
4 Spend somewhat more 
5 Spend a lot more 
OK Don't know/not applicable 
Participants 
1 PUBLIC EMPLOYERS AND THEIR UNIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
2 ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED WITH LOW INCOME GROUPS 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
AND FAMILIES 
3 HOMEOWNERS GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
4 NEIGHBOURHOOD GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
5 CIVIC GROUPS (E.G. ACTION CTTME. ON STATUS OF 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
WOMEN) 
6 ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED WITH MINORITY GROUPS 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
7 TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATIONS 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
8 BUSINESSMEN AND BUSINESS-ORIENTED GROUPS OR 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
ORGANIZATIONS (E.G. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE) 
9 THE ELDERLY 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
10 LOCAL MEDIA (RADIO, TV, PRESS) 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
11 CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
12 INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
13 CONSERVATIVE PARTY 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
14 LIBERAL PARTY 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
15 NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
16 OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFY PARTY) 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
17 MAYOR 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
18 CITY COUNCIL 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
19 CITY MANAGER OR GAO 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
20 CITY FINANCE STAFF 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
21 DEPARTMENT HEADS 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
22 FEDERAL AGENCIES 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
23 PROVINCIAL AGENCIES 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
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Q8 Please indicate how active the participant has been in pursuing this 
spending preference. C1rcle one of the six answers for each of the 
types of participants. Has the participant carried on 
1 No activity 
2 Little activity 
3 Some activity 
4 A lot of activity 
5 The most activity of any participant 
OK Don't know/not applicable 
Participants 
1 PUBLIC EMPLOYERS AND THEIR UNIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
2 ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED WITH LOW INCOME GROUPS 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
AND FAMILIES 
3 HOMEOWNERS GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
4 NEIGHBOURHOOD GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
5 CIVIC GROUPS (E.G. ACTION CTTME. ON STATUS OF 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
WOMEN) 
6 ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED WITH MINORITY GROUPS 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
7 TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATIONS 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
8 BUSINESSMEN AND BUSINESS-ORIENTED GROUPS OR 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
ORGANIZATIONS (E.G. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE) 
9 THE ELDERLY 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
10 LOCAL MEDIA (RADIO, TV, PRESS) 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
11 CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
12 INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
13 CONSERVATIVE PARTY 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
14 LIBERAL PARTY 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
15 NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
16 OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFY PARTY) 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
17 MAYOR 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
18 CITY COUNCIL 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
19 CITY MANAGER OR GAO 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
20 CITY FINANCE STAFF 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
21 DEPARTMENT HEADS 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
22 FEDERAL AGENCIES 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
23 PROVINCIAL AGENCIES 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
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Q9 Please indicate how often the city government responded favorably to 
the spending preference of the participant in the last three years. 
Circle one of the six answers for each of the types of participants. 
The city has responded favorably. 
1 Almost never 
2 Less than half the time 
3 About half the time 
4 More than half the time 
5 Almost all the time 
DK Don•t know/not applicable 
Participants 
1 PUBLIC EMPLOYERS AND THEIR UNIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
2 ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED WITH LOW INCOME GROUPS 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
AND FAMILIES 
3 HOMEOWNERS GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
4 NEIGHBOURHOOD GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
5 CIVIC GROUPS (E.G. ACTION CTTME. ON STATUS OF 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
WOMEN) 
6 ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED WITH MINORITY GROUPS 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
7 TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATIONS 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
8 BUSINESSMEN AND BUSINESS~ORIENTED GROUPS OR 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
ORGANIZATIONS (E.G. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE) 
9 THE ELDERLY 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
10 LOCAL MEDIA (RADIO, TV, PRESS) 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
11 CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
12 INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
13 CONSERVATIVE PARTY 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
14 LIBERAL PARTY 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
15 NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
16 OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFY PARTY) 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
17 MAYOR 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
18 CITY COUNCIL 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
19 CITY MANAGER OR GAO 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
20 CITY FINANCE STAFF 1 2 3 4 5 DK 
21 DEPARTMENT HEADS 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
22 FEDERAL AGENCIES 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
23 PROVINCIAL AGENCIES 1 2 3 4 5 OK 
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Q10 The types of participants listed above are frequently active in city 
government affairs. Could you list the 5 types of participants which 
are most influential in decisions affecting city fiscal matters in the 
past three years? (Feel free to mention participants not on the above 
1 i st.) 
1 
------------------
2 
------------------
3 
-----------------
4 
------------------
5 
Q11 What are the five most influential participants in city government in 
general (not just in fiscal matters)? 
A. Same five as in Q10. 
--
B. If any are different from Q10, please list all five. 
--
1 
------------------
2 
------------------
3 
------------------
4 
------------------
5 
------------------
PART III. VIEW ON GOVERNMENT AND SOCIAL POLICIES 
These are some widely used survey questions. We plan to use them to 
compare (1) cities with each other, and (2) city leaders with national 
samples of citizens. 
Q12 If your city government were given an increase in General Transfer 
Payment equal to 20 percent of total local expenditures, how would you 
like to see the funds used? (Circle one number) 
1 REDUCE PROPERTY TAXES AND OTHER LOCAL TAXES 
2 INCREASE ALL SERVICES EQUALLY 
3 INCREASE BASIC SERVICES (LIKE POLICE AND FIRE) 
4 INCREASE CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE 
5 INCREASE SOCIAL SERVICES 
6 OTHER 
----------------------------------------------------
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Q13 "Federal income taxes should be cut by at least one third even if it 
means reducing military spending and cutting down on government 
services such as health and education." What is your feeling? (Circle 
one number) 
1 AGREE 
2 DISAGREE 
3 DON'T KNOW/NOT APPLICABLE 
Q14 Should city council members vote mainly to do what is best for their 
district or ward or to do what is best for the city as a whole even if 
it doesn't really help their own district? What is your feeling? 
(Circle one number) 
1 DISTRICT 
2 CITY AS WHOLE 
3 DON'T KNOW 
Q15 How important is the religious, ethnic, or national background of 
candidates in slating and campaigns for your city council? (Circle one 
number) 
1 VERY IMPORTANT AND EXPLICITY DISCUSSED IN SLATING AND CAMPAIGNS 
2 FAIRLY IMPORTANT 
3 OCCASIONALLY IMPORTANT 
4 SELDOM IMPORTANT 
5 VIRTUALLY NEVER EXPLICITY DISCUSSED 
6 DON'T KNOW/NOT APPLICABLE 
Q16 Would you favor or oppose a law which would require a person to obtain 
a police permit before he or she could buy a gun? (Circle one number} 
1 FAVOR 
2 OPPOSE 
3 DON'T KNOW 
Q17 In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of school children from 
one school to another and merger/closure of schools when enrolments 
decline? (Circle one number) 
1 AGREE 
2 DISAGREE 
3 DON'T KNOW/NOT APPLICABLE 
Q18 "If a political leader helped people who need it, it doesn't matter 
that some of the rules are broken." What is your feeling? (Circle one 
number) 
1 AGREE 
2 DISAGREE 
3 DON'T KNOW/NOT APPLICABLE 
Q19 Would you be for or against sex education in public schools? (Circle 
one number) 
1 FOR 
2 AGAINST 
3 DON'T KNOW/NOT APPLICABLE 
Q20 Do you think abortion should be legal under any circumstances, legal 
only under certain circumstances, or never legal under any 
circumstances? (Circle one number) 
1 UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES 
2 UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES 
3 NEVER LEGAL 
4 DON'T KNOW/NOT APPLICABLE 
Q21 Prime Minister Trudeau has urged all levels of government to follow 
voluntary wage restraint (six and five percent guidlines) program to 
hold down spending and taxes. The Conservative and New Democratic 
Parties, on the other hand, say that the Federal government should 
allocate more money for job creation to reduce unemployment. Which 
position do you agree with more ~ holding down spending and taxes or 
spending more money for job creation programs? {Circle one number) 
1 HOLDING DOWN SPENDING 
2 MORE JOB CREATION PROGRAMS 
3 UNDECIDED 
PART IV. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Finally, a few background questions about yourself for statistical 
pruposes. 
Q22 How many terms have you served a mayor? {Circle one number) 
1 ONE (This is my first term) 
2 TWO 
3 THREE 
4 MORE THAN THREE 
Q23 Approximately how many years have you spent in elected office? 
(YEARS) 
-----------------------------
Q24 Although many cities have non~partisan elections, parties still are 
sometimes important. What political party, if any, do you identify 
with? (Circle one number) 
1 CONSERVATIVE PARTY 
2 LIBERAL PARTY 
3 NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
4 OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFY) -------------
Q25 How often did you mention this party affiliation in your last 
campaign? (Circle one number) 
1 ALMOST ALWAYS 
2 FREQUENTLY 
3 SELDOM 
4 ALMOST NEVER 
5 NEVER 
Q26 How active was your party in your last election? (Circle one number) 
1 PARTY HELPED SELECT AND ENDORSE ME AND WAS ACTIVE IN CAMPAIGN 
2 PARTY ACTIVE IN CAMPAIGN 
3 PARTY OCCASIONALLY PARTICIPATED 
4 PARTY NOT ACTIVE IN CAMPAIGN 
Q27 Approximately how often do you meet with local party officials? 
(Circle one number) 
1 SEVERAL TIMES A MONTH 
2 ONCE A MONTH 
3 SEVERAL TIMES A YEAR 
4 SELDOM 
5 NEVER 
Q28 How often did you use the local media (radio, TV, the press) in the 
last two months of your last campaign? (Please include both paid 
advertisements and other media coverage) (Cirlce one number) 
1 NAME APPEARED IN THE MEDIA SEVERAL TIMES A DAY 
2 NAME APPEARED ABOUT ONCE A DAY 
3 NAME APPEARED ABOUT ONCE A WEEK 
4 NAME APPEARED LESS THAN ONCE A WEEK 
5 DON 1T KNOW/NOT APPLICABLE 
Q29 Excluding election periods, how often have you appeared in the local 
media in the past two years? (Circle one number) 
1 NAME APPEARED IN THE MEDIA SEVERAL TIMES A DAY 
2 NAME APPEARED ABOUT ONCE A DAY 
3 NAME APPEARED A FEW TIMES A WEEK 
4 NAME APPEARED LESS THAN ONCE A WEEK 
5 DON 1T KNOW/NOT APPLICABLE 
Q30 Sometimes elected officials believe that they should take policy 
positions which are unpopular with the majority of their constituents. 
About how often would you estimate that you took a position against the 
dominant opinion of your constituents? (Cirle one number) 
1 NEVER OR ALMOST NEVER 
2 ONLY RARELY 
3 ABOUT ONCE A MONTH 
~ ~~80LA~~M ONCE A MONTH 
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Q31 How do you feel about the total local tax burden (from city, country, 
school district, and special district governments)? (Circle one 
number) 
1 SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED 
2 SHOULD BE REDUCED SOMEWHAT 
3 ABOUT RIGHT 
4 SHOULD BE INCREASED SOMEWHAT 
5 SHOULD BE INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY 
6 DON 1T KNOW 
Q32 Please indicate your present age. 
(YEARS) 
--------
Q33 Which of the following best describes your ethnic or racial 
identification? (Circle one number) 
1 WHITE (ANGLOPHONE) 
2 WHITE (FRANCOPHONE) 
3 WHITE (OTHER THAN ABOVE, PLEASE SPECIFY) 
4 NON WHITE (PLEASE SPECIFY) 
--------~----
Q34 Are you (Circle one number) 
1 MALE 
2 FEMALE 
Q35 Is your religious background? (Circle one number) 
1 PROTESTANT 
2 CATHOLIC 
3 JEWISH 
4 OTHER 
Q36 What is the highest grade or year in elementary school, high school, or 
college you have completed? (Circle one number) 
NONE • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1 
ELEMENTARY 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 
HIGH SCHOOL ••....•••.•. 09 10 11 12 
COLLEGE .....••....••..• 13 14 15 16 
SOME GRADUATE SCHOOL ..••..••.••. 17 
GRADUATE OR PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL 18 
Q37 Name of person completing this questionnaire 
Address 
---------------------
-------------------------------------------------
Telephone __ ~~-----------------------------------------
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Is there anything else that you would like to tell us concerning Fiscal 
Austerity and Urban Innovation~~any particular lessons from your city, 
solutions you may have found, or problems that remain that you would like to 
bring to the attention of others? Comments here or in a separate letter 
would be welcome. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP ~ WE HOPE THE RESULTS CAN HELP YOUR CITY 
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Appendix (iii) 
Organized Interest Groups receiving $10,000+ from City of Winnipeg (As 
Authorized up to December 1983) 
1. Winnipeg Art Gallery 280,880 
2. Age and Opportunity Centre 104,000 
3. Winnipeg Convention and Visitors Bureau 100,450 
4. Rainbow Stage Inc. 99,000 
5. Royal Winnipeg Ballet 99,000 
6. l~i nnipeg Symphony Orchestra 99,000 
7. Main Street Project Inc. 58,992 
8. Arc Industries Inc. 47,500 
9. Salvation Army 41,100 
10. Community Folk Arts Council of Winnipeg Inc. 32,000 
11. Canadian National Institute for the Blind 30,000 
12. Faculty of Physical Educ. and Recreation Studies 30,000 
13. Winnipeg Humane Society {one-time grant) 30,000 
14. Lions Club of Winnipeg (one-time grant) 30,000 
15. Canadian Association for the Mentally Retarded 26,000 
16. Kinsmen Reh~Fit Centre (one-time grant) 23,986 
17. Planned Parenthood l~innipeg Inc. 18,600 
18. Midwestern Rail Assn. (1975) Inc. (one-time grant) 17,369 
19. P. C. Party of Canada (Manitoba Association) 15,000 
20. Scandinavian Centre 15,000 
21. Ukrainian Cultural and Educational Centre 14,011 
22. Men•s Music Club 13,000 
23. Manitoba Opera Association 11,300 
24. Contemporary Dancers 11,000 
25. Citizenship Council of Manitoba 10,300 
total 1,258,488 
total of all Special Grants 1 ,448 '723 
~ ~ ~ 
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